Immigrants and Crime by Stageman, Daniel L
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Publications and Research John Jay College of Criminal Justice 
2020 
Immigrants and Crime 
Daniel L. Stageman 
CUNY John Jay College 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/jj_pubs/461 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
Immigrants and Crime
Page 1 of 35
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/crimi­
nology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited 
(for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 25 August 2020
Subject:  Critical Criminology, International Crime Online Publication Date:  Jul 2020
DOI:  10.1093/acrefore/9780190264079.013.563




The gap between public perception of immigrant criminality and the research consensus 
on immigrants’ actual rates of criminal participation is persistent and cross-cultural. 
While the available evidence shows that immigrants worldwide tend to participate in 
criminal activity at rates slightly lower than the native-born, media and political discourse 
portraying immigrants as uniquely crime-prone remains a pervasive global phenomenon. 
This apparent disconnect is rooted in the dynamics of othering, or the tendency to dehu­
manize and criminalize identifiable out-groups. Given that most migration decisions are 
motivated by economic factors, othering is commonly used to justify subjecting immi­
grants to exploitative labor practices, with criminalization often serving as the rationale 
for excluding immigrants from full participation in the social contract. When considered 
in the context of social harm, immigrants’ relationship to crime and criminality becomes 
more complex, especially where migration decisions are forced or made under coercive 
circumstances involving ethnic cleansing, genocide, or other state crimes; many recent 
examples of these dynamics have rendered large numbers of migrants effectively state­
less. Experiencing the direct or collateral effects of state crimes can, in turn, affect immi­
grants’ participation in a wide range of crime types, from status crimes such as prostitu­
tion or survival theft to terrorism and organized criminal activity such as drug trafficking 
or human trafficking. While there is no available research evidence indicating that immi­
grants participate in any given crime type at higher rates than the native-born, the dy­
namics of transnational criminal activity—reliant on multinational social networks, multi­
lingual communication, and transportation across borders—favor immigrant participa­
tion, though such crimes are often facilitated by multinational corporations.
Keywords: immigrants, immigration, crime, criminality, othering, social harm, globalization, statelessness, interna­
tional criminology
Introduction
Despite a strong and long-standing social scientific consensus that immigrants engage in 
crime at levels slightly below their native-born counterparts (Ousey & Kubrin, 2018; 
Sampson, 2008), fear of crime associated with immigrants remains a global phenomenon, 
driving political rhetoric, media discourse, policymaking, criminal justice, and immigra­
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tion control practices from North America to Europe to the Global South. The perceived 
association between immigrants and criminality is a phenomenon with deep historical 
roots that transcend any particular culture; it is linked to ethnocentrism and othering, 
wherein dominant groups react to their exposure to alien cultural practices by criminaliz­
ing those practices and dehumanizing the immigrants who practice them (Young, 2007). 
In the contemporary neoliberal global system, othering has led to immigrants being par­
ticularly vulnerable to economic and other forms of exploitation (Cheliotis, 2017), as well 
as criminal victimization ranging from fraud and human trafficking to genocide and eth­
nic cleansing.
While the consistent portrayal and perception of immigrants as disproportionately crime- 
prone is a misconception of their criminal participation across a global mean, both natur­
al variance and contextual factors can lead to immigrant participation in specific crime 
types and places that departs from that mean. While the decision to immigrate is most of­
ten driven by the push-pull factors of labor supply (of which there is generally an excess 
in source countries) and labor demand (excess in destination countries), circumstances of 
immigration, such as its motivations and the reception immigrant’s experience upon ar­
rival in destination countries, can vary significantly in ways that correlate with immigrant 
participation in specific crime types. For these reasons and others related to contempo­
rary dynamics of globalization, immigrants in many regions of the world engage in pat­
terns of crime and criminality that are qualitatively distinct from the patterns of their na­
tive-born counterparts; transnational criminal networks, for example, commonly consist 
of disproportionate numbers of immigrants due to their reliance on international relation­
ships for their primary criminal activities (Selee, 2018). Current systems of immigration 
control and enforcement, however, are generally poorly designed to address specific qual­
itative variations in the criminal participation of immigrants, instead adopting a totalizing 
approach that elides the distinction between criminal and non-criminal immigrants (or 
crime severity) and utilizes exclusion, detention, and deportation in a manner that exacer­
bates criminality and other social problems within the communities targeted.
Dynamics of Global Migration
Contemporary global migration features a number of routes and patterns that are unique 
to the 21st century, alongside continued large-scale flows rooted in the postcolonial rela­
tionships of the second half of the 20th century (Castles & Miller, 2009). The United 
States has been the top destination for immigrants throughout this period, currently host­
ing some 20% of the world’s migrants, who make up about 14% of the country’s 320 mil­
lion residents. The first major shift in 20th-century immigration patterns to the United 
States occurred with the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act, which removed quotas fa­
voring migrants from Europe. Following passage of the act, the largest source of immi­
grants to the United States shifted rapidly from Europe to Latin America (primarily Mexi­
co). More recent shifts have seen a sharp decrease in Mexican immigration to the United 
States, with increasing numbers fleeing crime and violence in the Northern Triangle 
countries of Central America (El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) as irregular mi­
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Figure 1.  Comparative populations of foreign-born 
residents in the United States from China, India and 
Mexico, 2000–2013.
grants and asylum seekers. Large numbers of economic migrants from South and East 
Asia (primarily India and China) currently dominate authorized migration to the United 
States (Chishti & Hipsman, 2015), seeking opportunities as students, entrepreneurs, and 
tech workers (see Figure 1).
In Europe, migrant flows from former overseas colonies (such as from the Caribbean and 
South Asia to the United Kingdom; Suriname and Indonesia to Holland; and Algeria, West 
Africa, and Southeast Asia to France), while still active, were first eclipsed by refugee 
flows from the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, followed by internal European migrants 
from East to West after the accession of several less economically prosperous Eastern Eu­
ropean nations to the common labor market of the European Union (EU) in 2004. Finally, 
a recent wave of refugees, primarily fleeing the civil war in Syria and ongoing conflicts in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, has led anti-immigrant sentiment to the forefront of political dis­
course across the continent, arguably driving the election of increasingly authoritarian 
governments (Stockemer, 2016). A similar movement to Australia has led the government 
there to adopt the controversial policy of indefinite extraterritorial detention for attempt­
ed irregular migrants and asylum seekers on Manus Island and elsewhere in Papua New 
Guinea (Welch, 2014). Across the rest of the world, noteworthy migration flows include 
mass movements of contract laborers from South Asia and the Philippines to the oil-pro­
ducing nations of the Arabian peninsula (where they make up nearly 90% of the current 
population of the United Arab Emirates) (McPhillips, 2017), continued flows into Russia 
from the states of the former Soviet Union, and the flight of Rohingya refugees into 
Bangladesh from ethnic cleansing in Myanmar. Intracontinental economic and other mi­
gration also takes place in Latin America (e.g., from Bolivia and Venezuela into Brazil), 
Africa (from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Ghana, etc., into South Africa), and Asia (from Southeast 
Asia and the Philippines into China, Japan, and Korea), albeit involving considerably low­
er rates and total numbers alike.
The history of global migration, from ancient times to the present, is one that is complex 
and punctuated by conflict, colonialism, imperialism, slavery, the displacement of indige­
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nous peoples, and genocide; these legacies contribute to contemporary ethnic conflicts 
and economic disparities that drive immigration to the present day. Rarely, however, are 
they considered contextual factors in recent discourse around the presumed criminal 
propensities of immigrants, except insofar as the violence and other social problems left 
in their wake feed into racial and ethnic stereotypes that ostensibly explain why migrants 
belonging to these groups are undesirable, biologically or culturally inferior, or crime- 
prone. Legacies of colonialism are insufficiently discussed as drivers of immigration, or to 
contextualize major migration flows in terms of prior extractions of wealth and resources 
that followed the same routes and directionality. Postcolonial migration to Europe and the 
United States from countries where large amounts of resources and wealth were extract­
ed and removed during colonial periods is logical as a historical economic corrective: 
populations relocating from source countries denuded of wealth and resources, in order 
to sell their labor at fair market rates in the destination countries to which their original 
wealth and resources were removed.1 Critical criminology and other critical social sci­
ence disciplines foreground these issues in their examinations of immigrants and crime, 
as examples of the harm—specifically social harm2—considered by critical criminologists 
as the appropriate metric for defining crime and measuring its severity (Yar, 2012). Tradi­
tional measures of crime often aggregate status offenses and survival crimes that repre­
sent minimal (if any) social harm, and research that measures crime rates among immi­
grants relies on these commonly used measures. A comprehensive reckoning with the 
contemporary or historically contextual “crimes of the powerful” that play an outsized 
role in driving global migration patterns presents a significant methodological challenge 
that has yet to be addressed in quantitative research into the relationship between immi­
grants and crime; it is also rarely addressed in political rhetoric or factored into immigra­
tion policymaking worldwide.
Theoretical Frameworks for Understanding the 
Myths and Realities of Immigrant Criminality
In examining the putative correlation between immigrant status and criminal participa­
tion, scholars have tested several potential explanations (hypotheses) for why immigrants 
might participate in criminal activity at rates that differ from those of their native-born 
counterparts. The first set of hypotheses discussed here are potential explanations for 
why immigrants might commit crime at higher levels than the native-born; while these 
have proved largely unsupported by the available evidence, they remain a feature of gov­
ernment policy in the design and rationale for immigration control and enforcement sys­
tems worldwide (Beck, 1996; Tonry, 1997, 2014; Zatz & Smith, 2012). The second set of 
explanations for why immigrants may commit crimes at lower rates than the native-born 
have been supported by the evidence in scholarly analyses across a range of social sci­
ence disciplines, including criminology, sociology, anthropology, political science, geogra­
phy, and economics.3 Hypotheses in both categories, however, require continued testing 
across national and cultural contexts and crime types in order to more firmly establish 
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scholarly consensus on their importance as mediating factors in the relationship between 
immigrants and crime.
Potential Mediating Factors Tending to Increase Immigrant Crime
As noted in the section “THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING THE 
MYTHS AND REALITIES OF IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY,” the hypotheses discussed here 
have generally not been supported by the available evidence across the national contexts 
in which they have been studied (Disha, 2019; Mears, 2001; Tonry, 1997). They remain, 
however, a key feature of the political and policy debates surrounding immigrants and 
crime in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere (Epps & Furman, 2016; Grajzl, East­
wood, & Dimitrova-Grajzl, 2018). Because these ideas continue to fuel anti-immigrant 
rhetoric and are frequently put forward as justifications for restrictive immigration poli­
cies and broad approaches to immigration enforcement, they are subjects of continued 
study by social scientists.
• Immigrants might come from cultures of origin where crime is comparatively accept­
able (Mears, 2001). This contention may be framed as a variant of cultural deficit theo­
ry4 when discussed generally (Patel, 2016), or as culture conflict theory in discussion of 
specific crime types and categories of immigrants, such as the perceived higher partic­
ipation rates of Muslim immigrants in terrorist activity (Erez, 2000; Freilich, Newman, 
Shoham, & Addad, 2018; Martinez & Lee, 2000; Sampson, 2008; Wortley, 2009).
• Immigrants might not respect the laws or culture of the destination country. Another 
variant of culture conflict theory, this explanation suggests that immigrants oppose 
specific aspects of the destination country’s legal codes or cultural traditions, or ac­
tively choose to participate in criminal activity because of disagreement with or disap­
proval of the destination country’s foreign policy, history, economic system, and so on. 
Again, this explanation is commonly deployed to explain presumed immigrant dedica­
tion to terrorism. It is also utilized to support popular assumptions of criminality 
among irregular migrants, who may have engaged in illegal border crossings or visa 
overstays that many see as fundamentally criminal acts. In this interpretation, the will­
ingness of immigrants to undertake an illegal border crossing is seen as an indication 
of their willingness to violate other legal codes once in residence in the destination 
country.5
• Criminals may emigrate in disproportionately higher numbers than law-abiding mem­
bers of society from source countries, resulting in immigrant flows that are dispropor­
tionately criminal. This idea posits immigration as a specific opportunity for criminals, 
who in turn make a rational choice to immigrate in order to pursue criminal gain in 
destination countries. It has been promoted heavily by current U.S. President Donald 
Trump and members of his administration, who suggest that Mexico and Central Amer­
ica are “not sending their best” but rather large numbers of gang members, drug traf­
fickers, and others who do not fit the typical profile of the labor migrant.
• An inability or disinclination on the part of immigrants to assimilate or integrate “ap­
propriately” into the culture and society of the destination country may lead them to 
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increased criminality out of need, naiveté, or frustration (Disha, 2019). It may also lead 
to increased marginalization of immigrant communities, which will take on through dif­
ferential association (Matsueda, 2001) the criminality assumed to be a feature of 
poverty and common to native-born minority groups with whom they now reside in 
close contact. On a community or neighborhood level, this dynamic also fits with social 
disorganization theory (Shaw & McKay, 1942), in which the ethnically and linguistical­
ly diverse urban neighborhoods that immigrants share with native-born minority 
groups lack the informal networks and social capital that suppress crime in more ho­
mogenous areas.
Potential Mediating Factors Tending to Decrease Immigrant Crime
The aforementioned labor market dynamics that drive the majority of global migration 
are often associated with differentials in mean quality of life between source and destina­
tion countries that are also a major factor in the decision to emigrate; in general, the 
more significant this differential, the more risk and effort migrants are willing to undergo 
to relocate (Massey, Durand, & Malone, 2003; Massey & Sanchez, 2010). Because eco­
nomic and quality-of-life motivators are the primary drivers for most decisions to relocate 
—with or without authorization or documentation—immigrants have a meaningful incen­
tive not to draw official attention to themselves as individuals or to their communities. 
Scholarly consensus holds that this is one of a suite of related incentives that provide a 
“protective factor” leading to lower rates of crime commission among first-generation im­
migrants and within the communities where they are found (Wolff, Intravia, Baglivio, & 
Piquero, 2018; Xie & Baumer, 2018). The majority of economic migrants are motivated 
workers with minimal idle time to participate in criminal activity; they have generally 
aged out of the most criminogenic phase of the life course (16–24); they have strong so­
cial networks and economic dependents, both in their countries of origin and in their des­
tination countries, and they are highly motivated, as evinced by success in carrying out 
their original decision to emigrate.
Structural factors may also play a role in the complex relationship between crime com­
mission and victimization. Immigrants who find themselves as linguistic minorities in 
their destination countries may have difficulty communicating with authorities in in­
stances of victimization or witnessing of a criminal act. Cultural insularity may also be a 
factor, particularly where perpetrators are fellow immigrants or members of the victim’s 
community. Unauthorized or undocumented immigrants may fear self-reporting criminal 
victimization or other kinds of interaction with legal authorities in destination countries, 
for fear of exposing their status.6 Finally, immigrants in destination countries where anti- 
immigrant sentiment is a strong and consistent presence in the national discourse may 
lack the necessary trust in their host society—or the legal authorities whom they perceive 
to represent its interests—to solve crime problems experienced by the immigrant commu­
nity. Thus, underreporting by immigrants of crimes such as domestic abuse, interpersonal 
violence, fraud, and theft, among others, may obscure community-level crime rates, and— 
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assuming a significant proportion of the perpetrators of these unreported crimes are 
themselves immigrants—obscure per capita rates of immigrant criminality.
Categories and Circumstances with Potentially 
Mediating Effects on Immigrant Crime Com­
mission
Several additional factors may further mediate the theoretical relationships between im­
migration and crime.
Generational Effects
Evidence suggests that as immigrants assimilate (i.e., second- or “1.5-generation” immi­
grants who made the journey as very young children), their criminal offending patterns 
meet—and in some cases exceed—those of their native-born counterparts (Bersani, 2014). 
The theory of segmented assimilation suggests that social class and racial/ethnic or reli­
gious minority status influence the trajectory of assimilation for second and subsequent 
generations of immigrants (Portes & Zhou, 1993; Rumbaut, 1994). The theory posits three 
distinct assimilation trajectories for immigrants based on these and other contextual fac­
tors: immigrants from middle-class backgrounds who are racially and ethnically similar to 
the national majority (or able to pass as such) assimilate smoothly into the destination 
country’s middle class within one or two generations; immigrants who are middle class 
and able to take an entrepreneurial approach to migration but are racially, ethnically, or 
religiously distinct become economically prosperous while maintaining a strong and sepa­
rate linguistic and cultural identity; and labor migrants who experience prejudice and 
curtailed economic opportunities in the destination country experience downward assimi­
lation (Waldinger & Feliciano, 2004), entering a cycle of poverty akin to that experienced 
by native minority groups (such as African Americans in the United States, indigenous 
peoples in Canada and Australia, etc.) that is most closely associated with an increase in 
criminal offending patterns at the one and a half and second generations (Bersani, 2014; 
Portes & Zhou, 1993; Rumbaut, 1994).
Irregular Migration, Unauthorized and Undocumented Immigrants
Immigrants who reside in destination countries where their presence has not been offi­
cially sanctioned by the relevant immigration authorities, and who therefore do not hold 
official documentation of their legal status, are described by scholars as “unauthorized” 
or “undocumented,” terms that will be used in tandem throughout this article. These de­
scriptors are widely considered more appropriate than the colloquial term “illegal immi­
grant” for a number of reasons: (a) they are more accurate, since illegal denotes actions 
that are proscribed in criminal law and immigration status is generally adjudicated under 
civil law; (b) they are grammatically correct, since illegal is an adjective appropriately ap­
plied to proscribed actions and activities rather than individuals; and (c) they do not serve 
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to criminalize immigrants, as the term “illegal immigrants” implies a pre-judgment of 
criminality where none may exist other than the civil status violation to which the phrase 
refers.
The development of the illegal immigrant archetype—along with the development of a 
massive, highly invasive immigration control and enforcement infrastructure in response 
—is primarily an American phenomenon, albeit one that has been adopted and adapted in 
a number of nations around the globe in the 21st century. In the developed world, fear of 
crime has gained considerable strength as a motivator of anti-immigrant sentiment and 
rationale for increasingly stringent immigration enforcement, overtaking concerns over 
labor competition, fears of disease or cultural contagion, tribalism, and overt racial or 
ethnic animus, among others—perhaps counterintuitively so, given the concurrent reality 
that crime rates have been dropping steadily across the developed world for some 30 
years (Tseloni, Mailley, Farrell, & Tilley, 2010). The reasons for these changes have been 
theorized in a number of ways by scholars in different schools of thought: in attempting 
to come to terms with the anti-immigrant rhetoric surrounding the Trump administration 
in the United States, Brexit in the United Kingdom (Golec de Zavala, Guerra, & Simao, 
2017; Outhwaite, 2018), or authoritarian leaders such as Hungary’s Victor Orban and 
Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, scholars and media commentators alike have remarked upon the 
degree of overt racial and ethnic animus expressed by these leaders themselves as well 
as their followers in advocating for or justifying anti-immigrant policies—often alongside 
rationales rooted in perceived immigrant criminality rather than in place of them. These 
critical scholars argue that this juxtaposition demonstrates that fear of crime is in fact a 
proxy for racial and ethnic animus, originally deployed due to social desirability or as an 
explicit political strategy intended to expand popular support. Given that both racial ani­
mus and criminalization are rooted in othering—the dehumanizing of people distinct from 
the majority or dominant group due to physical and cultural markers, participation in pro­
scribed or taboo activities, and so forth—this explanation is logically sound, if difficult to 
operationalize and therefore understudied.7
Extending this theoretical argument, scholars of political economy argue that anti-immi­
grant rhetoric and the resulting high levels of investment in control and enforcement in­
frastructure are tacitly promoted by corporations and holders of capital with a vested in­
terest in increasing public spending on securitization: that is, the infrastructure, policies 
and processes of incarceration, state surveillance, and coercive violence, particularly in 
the lives of the poor and disenfranchised (Astor, 2009; Menjivar, 2014; Trujillo-Pagan, 
2014). In addition to direct profits from increased public spending on privatized incarcer­
ation and security services, this approach further enhances the traditional role of immi­
grants as a flexible and exploitable low-wage labor source: if immigrant laborers are kept 
in a state of constant credible fear about an ever-growing immigration enforcement and 
control apparatus bent upon their incarceration and eventual removal, they will avoid 
drawing attention to themselves and their communities via labor actions or other advoca­
cy, and they will be less likely to report high levels of exploitation involving mechanisms 
such as wage theft, unsafe or unsanitary working conditions or employer-provided hous­
ing, violations of minimum wage and overtime laws, and the like (Sung, Delgado, Pena, & 
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Paladino, 2013). In the United States, attributions of criminality further enhance this flex­
ible exploitability by providing mechanisms for immigrants to occupy local and private 
correctional infrastructure that is increasingly underutilized due to falling incarceration 
rates; in Europe, the massive overrepresentation of immigrants in many correctional sys­
tems sustains them at their current scale, further fueling the economic engine of securiti­
zation there (Arriaga, 2016, 2017; De Giorgi, 2010; Stageman, 2019).
Stateless Populations
Many nations around the globe feature significant populations of stateless persons within 
their borders—often as a direct result of government policy. A stateless person is an indi­
vidual, ethnic group, or class of persons whose nationality is disputed or contested, and 
who therefore cannot draw upon citizenship rights in their country of residence, their 
country of origin (which are in many cases one and the same), or any other.8 Disputes re­
sulting in statelessness are often the result of long-standing ethnic or tribal antagonisms 
playing out in government policy, wherein the ascendant group seeks to further marginal­
ize and disenfranchise the subordinate one. Contemporary examples include the plight of 
ethnic Vietnamese residents in Cambodia, who are systematically being denied documen­
tation and pushed out of communities where they have resided for generations (Mauk, 
2018), or the Rohingya people in Myanmar, a Muslim minority in this primarily Buddhist 
country, who have been denied citizenship, subjected to ethnic cleansing, and pushed into 
neighboring Bangladesh in large numbers as refugees (Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, 2017). Attributions of criminality to the targeted minority group are a 
common aspect of the processes leading to their statelessness, as is the criminalization of 
specific cultural practices that can serve as a pretext to displacement. Groups subjected 
to statelessness are frequently displaced, leading them to flee to neighboring nations as 
refugees or seek asylum elsewhere.
Stateless peoples are at a significantly increased risk of victimization when compared to 
other migrant categories, encompassing both the state crimes and the crimes against hu­
manity discussed in this article, as well as human trafficking, forced labor, fraud, extor­
tion, and sexual and physical violence. It is unclear, however, whether stateless peoples 
are more likely to themselves engage in criminal activity, a question further obscured by 
the tendency of governments in their territories of origin to criminalize cultural practices 
and status offenses as a pretext to ethnic cleansing. Historically stateless or transient 
populations such as the Roma (colloquially known as Gypsies) of Europe or the “Irish 
Travellers” of the United Kingdom, have widely accepted reputations for criminality in 
their countries of residence and transit. These reputations are reinforced by a culture of 
transience within these communities, contributing to a sense on the part of settled popu­
lations of a separate and closed society with unknown values and unfamiliar traditions. 
While there is no indication that crime rates are higher for transient peoples such as the 
Roma, transient and closed societies provide increased opportunities and motivations for 
externally directed property crimes, contributing to a perception of higher rates of crimi­
nality regardless of the lack of evidence (Petrova, 2003). The mutually reinforcing dynam­
ics of othering directed at immigrants by native-born populations, and social closure and 
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enforced separation on the part of immigrant communities in response, are not unique to 
the Roma and other traditionally transient populations; indeed, they have long been ob­
served in the mutual suspicion between native and immigrant populations in Europe in 
particular (Safi, 2009). While there is again limited evidence that these dynamics con­
tribute to increased immigrant participation in crime regardless of their country of origin 
or residence, they do appear to hinder meaningful multicultural dialogue and curtail eco­
nomic and social opportunities for immigrants and their children in the communities in 
question.
Limitations on the Study of Immigrant Crimi­
nality
A number of factors limit empirical study of the relationship between immigration and 
crime in a global context.
Definitional Limitations
The relative lack of global consensus on definitions for the concepts of “crime” and “im­
migrant” alike precludes a full and complete reckoning with the involvement of immi­
grants in criminal activity worldwide. Major differences across international legal sys­
tems mean that what is legally proscribed in one nation-state may be both non-criminal 
and culturally acceptable in another; legal codes in nations that circumscribe human and 
civil rights within their borders may be widely viewed as unjust—and possibly criminal in 
and of themselves by the critical measure of social harm—in less authoritarian nations 
that place a higher value on democratic participation and individual autonomy. This 
means that crime and victim categories that have recently won hard-fought recognition in 
more progressive nations—such as rape or other sexual offenses, violent crimes including 
domestic violence, or hate crimes against women, racial/ethnic minorities, or LGBTQ indi­
viduals—may be officially unrecognized or tacitly ignored under more conservative crimi­
nal justice systems; in some of these societies, homosexuality itself is a punishable status 
offense (Carrington, Hogg, & Sozzo, 2016; Henne & Troshynski, 2013).
Limitations on the definition of “immigrant” also speak to major global controversies and 
disagreements. Some of these engender strong sentiments among the individuals and 
groups deeply invested in one or another interpretation of their meaning, while resisting 
easy resolution on the international stage. The Palestinian “right of return,” for example, 
is intended by groups representing the Palestinian cause to establish the inalienable right 
of Palestinian refugees to return to lands owned by their ancestors that are currently oc­
cupied by the state of Israel (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2016). This idea has also, however, al­
lowed the neighboring Arab countries surrounding Israel—many of which have for 
decades hosted sizable populations of Palestinian refugees and their descendants—to 
classify their Palestinian populations as refugees rather than immigrants. In some cases, 
this classification has persisted into the third and fourth generations, resulting in distinct 
internal populations who are not accorded the full rights of citizens (see the section 
Immigrants and Crime
Page 11 of 35
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/crimi­
nology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited 
(for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 25 August 2020
“STATELESS POPULATIONS”). The case for Turkish and other “guest workers” in Ger­
many was similar throughout the 20th century, while Germany’s jus sanguinis persisted 
(Schonteich, 2013).9 Until these laws were changed in the 21st century, multiple genera­
tions of Turks—many of whom had largely assimilated into mainstream German culture— 
lived within Germany’s borders but were not accorded the full rights of citizens. An even 
more stark example of this phenomenon currently persists in the oil-rich nations of the 
Arabian Peninsula, with the huge populations of South Asian and other “guest 
workers” (in the case of the United Arab Emirates, these workers make up almost 90% of 
the nation’s residents) whose ruthlessly exploited labor fueled these countries’ recent 
building booms and explosive economic growth (Gardner, 2010).
Limitations of the Available Evidence
In addition to definitional issues, the quality and reliability of statistics on both crime and 
immigration in many parts of the world are extremely limited—or, in the case of many na­
tions in the Global South, unavailable entirely outside very broad estimates (Fargues, 
2009). The control of data collection and distribution on these important social and demo­
graphic issues allows both authoritarian and ostensibly democratic governments to ma­
nipulate these statistics in ways that suit their political and public relations needs; in­
deed, the recent attempt in the United States to include questions about citizenship sta­
tus on the 2020 census is widely seen not as being motivated by a meaningful interest in 
collecting better data on this topic but as a political ploy to drive down response rates in 
areas with high concentrations of (especially unauthorized/undocumented) immigrants, 
thus reducing the proportional representation these populations are accorded in state 
and federal legislatures (New York et al. v. U.S. Department of Commerce et al., 2018).10 
Where data are unreliable, nonexistent, or widely viewed as subject to significant manipu­
lation, scholars cannot make decisive analyses of the connection (or lack thereof) be­
tween immigration and crime. The fact that others—such as political advocacy organiza­
tions, government officials, media commentators, or non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)—continue to make claims on the basis of such evidence reveals more about their 
motives and interests than it does about the issue at hand (Anti-Defamation League, 
2018; Berry, Garcia-Blanco, & Moore, 2015). The preponderance of the reliable evidence 
available reveals that there is nothing intrinsically criminogenic—or, indeed, anything in­
trinsically anti-criminogenic—about immigrants as a population category; rather, contex­
tual factors closely linked to the circumstances under which individuals and groups mi­
grate, their reception and status within the society and culture of the destination country, 
and the availability of economic opportunity and social support appear to influence the of­
fending patterns of first and subsequent generations of immigrants alike.
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Figure 2.  Top 20 destinations (left) and origins 
(right) of international migrants in 2015 (millions).
Source: U.N. Department of Economic and Social Af­
fairs (2015).
Regional Overviews of the Available Evidence 
on Immigrant Crime
Just as there is massive variance in the scale of immigration around the globe (see Figure 
2), there is also significant variance by region in the quantity, quality, and rigor of re­
search on the criminal participation of immigrants.11 This section attempts to provide an 
overview of the major issues surrounding immigrants, their treatment in political rhetoric 
and popular discourse, and their involvement in crime in each of the listed regions. For 
some of these regions, however, little to no reliable research exists on the subject. Where 
this is the case, we have drawm information from related scholarly research, NGO re­
ports, and mainstream media to provide a broad sense of the issues and perceptions fac­
ing contemporary immigrants in the areas in question, with all possible consideration of 
real or perceived immigrant crime participation within the confines of the available evi­
dence.
Immigrants in North America
Much of the most reliable global evidence on immigrant crime participation comes from 
North America, and the United States in particular. The importance of immigration to 
American history cannot be overstated, nor can the degree to which that history is inter­
twined with ideas of crime: much of the immigration to the continent during the colonial 
period preceding American independence was driven by transportation, or the official ex­
ile of British convicted criminals to the country’s overseas possessions (transportation al­
so features heavily in Australian history, to the extent that it has become part of the 
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nation’s foundational identity) (Bleichmar, 1999; Ekirch, 1990). While this practice was 
quickly curtailed by the newly independent United States, the exploitative labor that was 
its most salient economic feature continued, in successive waves of European mass mi­
gration (most notably from regions suffering significant poverty and privation) to the 
North, and in the importation of enslaved Africans to the South. In both cases, attribu­
tions of criminal propensity to these ethnically distinct populations were frequently uti­
lized to rationalize coercive practices directed against them by the state and private in­
terests, further ensuring that these groups provided the maximum labor for the minimum 
cost. While the successive generations of European immigrants and their offspring assim­
ilated over time into the developing dominant ethnic category of whiteness, the dominant 
white majority expended considerable social, cultural, economic, and political effort to 
maintain the separate and inferior status of blackness for the country’s African American 
minority, even after the ending of slavery following the American Civil War (Patterson, 
1985). The codification of these categories further extended labor exploitation (through 
mechanisms such as convict leasing) and social exclusion (through Jim Crow segregation) 
for black Americans (Mancini, 1996).
The legally defined minority status of African Americans, in turn, provided the template 
for additional excluded and marginalized racial categories that developed as labor migra­
tion to the country became increasingly globalized and diverse. This process culminated 
in the 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act which established the first major restriction on immi­
gration to the United States, and brought a formerly localized and largely informal immi­
gration control apparatus under the purview of the federal government (Kanstroom, 
2007; Trucios-Haynes, 1997). Restrictions around racial and ethnic undesirability became 
increasingly caught up in attributions of criminal intent as the states of the American 
South turned to techniques such as convict leasing to justify the continued forced labor of 
African Americans post-slavery (Mancini, 1996); such policies provided legal precedent 
for exploiting the labor of ostensibly crime-prone non-European immigrants when the 
economy required, and forcibly ejecting them when it did not. This dynamic found its 
starkest example in the Bracero Program which brought Mexican workers into the coun­
try during the labor shortages of World War II, and Operation Wetback which deported 
them en masse once the pressing need for their labor had subsided (Astor, 2009). Far 
from being a new phenomenon, the current promotion of the myth of the criminal immi­
grant in U.S. political discourse and federal government policy is a long-standing tradi­
tion, featuring complex layers of legal precedent and cultural rationalization, which 
serves to instrumentalize vast segments of the largest immigrant population in the world 
to the considerable benefit of American enterprise—and in a manner that explicitly rein­
forces an American racial hierarchy particularly benefiting whites (Prieto, 2018).
American research on immigrant criminality thus takes place within the context of this 
tension: the vital importance of immigration to the formation and founding myths of the 
American Republic; the social and legal realities of a racially stratified society, at best 
partially dismantled by the successes of the Civil Rights Movement; a long-standing tradi­
tion of crimmigration, in which the intertwined apparatuses of crime control and immi­
gration control serve the interests of capital (Stumpf, 2006) by disciplining labor and se­
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curitizing (i.e., through mass incarceration) whole populations whose labor force partici­
pation is tenuous; and a sizable population of uniquely vulnerable undocumented immi­
grants, who face alongside America’s other underprivileged groups a host of severe social 
problems associated with poverty and social exclusion, of which crime is only one impor­
tant element. The surprising quality and quantity of American research on this issue 
across the social sciences therefore belies the extraordinary political pressures under 
which much of this work has taken place, particularly since Donald Trump’s election to 
the American presidency on an explicitly anti-immigrant platform. As collected in a meta-analy­
sis by Ousey and Kubrin (2018), 51 high-quality quantitative studies conducted between 
1994 and 2014 found statistically significant negative correlations between immigration 
and crime two and a half times as often as positive ones, indicating an overall dynamic 
that is both globally consistent, and deeply at odds with the driving narrative in U.S. poli­
tics and policy. There are clear indications that aggressive immigration enforcement and 
highly restrictive immigration control policies exacerbate social problems within immi­
grant communities, rather than providing meaningful solutions to social problems experi­
enced by U.S. residents as a whole (Engelbrecht, 2018; Leyro & Stageman, 2018).
This established American template—of media coverage, political discourse, and immigra­
tion policy at odds with scientific consensus—is followed worldwide, with minimal varia­
tion (Segal, Elliott, & Mayadas, 2010; Silverman & Massa, 2012). Further, U.S. policies 
around the punishment of immigrants—through civil detention and deportation, as well as 
the hypercriminalization of immigration offenses—have provided a template that coun­
tries around the world have adopted to varying degrees in their own immigration enforce­
ment.12 With its origins in the lockdown refugee camps the United States developed as a 
racialized response to the influx of Haitian “boat people” in the early 1980s—and public 
fear of their presumed criminal propensities—the U.S. immigrant detention system 
evolved into an infrastructure that currently confines an average of nearly 50,000 immi­
grants on any given day (Altman & Small, 2019; Chishti, Pierce, & Capps, 2019; Loyd & 
Mountz, 2018). Its exponential 40-year growth can be explained in part by the actions of 
“punishment entrepreneurs”: private, for-profit prison corporations and local govern­
ments seeking to host detention facilities as economic anchors to offset the loss of manu­
facturing jobs (Stageman, 2019). The potential for profit and other economic benefits 
gives numerous individuals and institutional actors a direct self-interest in the continued 
criminalization of immigrants; not only do for-profit detention corporations like GEO 
Group and CoreCivic lobby for criminalizing and punitive immigration policies, they have 
also spread their detention business model to other countries such as the United King­
dom and Australia (see sections “IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM” and “IMMI­
GRANTS IN AUSTRALIA”) (Flynn & Cannon, 2009; Furman, Epps, & Lamphear, 2016; 
Mainwaring & Cook, 2018). No other country, however, has privatized immigrant deten­
tion to an extent that approaches the United States, where current estimates suggest up 
to 73% of detained immigrants are held in private, for-profit facilities (Haberman, 2018).
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Figure 3.  Comparative Venezualan diaspora popula­
tions, 2015 and 2017–2018
Source: Migration trends in the Americas 
(International Organization for Migration, 2018).
Immigrants in Latin America and the Caribbean
Outside border regions that feature regular cross-border traffic, internal migration within 
Latin America is estimated to be low. As a transit point for immigrants from Central 
America, Africa, South Asia, and elsewhere seeking to enter the United States, Mexico 
has increasingly become an indefinite stopover for those prevented from reaching their 
intended destination. This phenomenon has intensified with the Trump administration’s 
“Remain in Mexico” policy, under which individuals seeking asylum at the U.S. border are 
prevented from entering until their asylum hearing takes place. This policy, partly justi­
fied through appeals to public safety rooted in attributions of criminality to asylum seek­
ers, has in fact resulted in this already vulnerable population experiencing high rates of 
criminal victimization during their time in Mexico (Human Rights First, 2019). In South 
America, political unrest, government corruption, and shortages of food and other basic 
needs goods have caused significant outmigration from Venezuela to the surrounding 
countries of Colombia, Peru, and Brazil (see Figure 3), where these immigrants are fre­
quently blamed in the media for increases in criminal activity in the communities where 
they settle (Faiola & Lopes, 2018; International Organization for Migration, 2018). In the 
Caribbean, attributions of criminality to Haitian immigrants and residents of Haitian de­
scent in the neighboring Dominican Republic were the driving force for the latter 
country’s 2013 change in citizenship law, rendering some 134,000 Haitians and Domini­
cans of Haitian descent effectively stateless (Alami, 2018; Jones, 2018).
Immigrants in the United Kingdom
Anti-immigrant sentiment and perceptions of immigrant criminality among native-born 
Britons was a major driver of the Brexit referendum’s unexpected success (Golec de 
Zavala et al., 2017), presenting a clear parallel to the disconnect between U.S. political 
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discourse and the research consensus on the involvement of immigrants in criminal activ­
ity. Available research on the involvement of UK immigrants in crime and criminal activity 
indicates that the relationship there is similar to that found in the United States: either no 
effect or a modestly negative one (Bell, Fasani, & Machin, 2013). This pattern was estab­
lished in the 20th century with the steady postcolonial influx of immigrants from the 
South Asian nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Jaitman & Machin, 2013). Find­
ings of no relationship or a negative relationship between immigrants and crime have re­
mained consistent across the two major subsequent waves of immigration to the United 
Kingdom that have taken place since 1997: a large flow of asylum seekers fleeing wars 
and breakdowns in national governance in countries including Yugoslavia, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, and Somalia that peaked around 2002 and an influx of EU citizens from the 
countries of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the Baltic 
States following their accession to the EU’s common labor market in 2004. Despite these 
immigration waves being highly distinct both culturally and economically, none led to an 
increase in either property crime or violent crime. More recently, large-scale immigration 
from Romania and Bulgaria to the United Kingdom following the 2014 accession of those 
countries to the EU was found to exhibit the same pattern—though high levels of immi­
gration from this wave were found to be correlated with slightly higher levels of drug of­
fenses (Stansfield, 2016). This finding tends to support the idea that transnational and re­
lated crime (see section “IMMIGRANTS AND TRANSNATIONAL CRIME”) is one excep­
tional category in which immigrants may be overrepresented.
Despite a basis in bad faith arguments and mistaken beliefs about the place of immi­
grants in British society, the process of withdrawal from membership in the European 
Union set in motion by the 2016 Brexit referendum has been finalized in 2020. The exact 
nature of the more restrictive immigration control policies that will follow has yet to be 
determined, along with what—if any—effect these measures may have on crime rates in 
the United Kingdom. The co-occurrence of the United Kingdom’s large-scale 21st-century 
increase in immigration with a crime drop similar to that experienced by the United 
States over the same time period (Redgrave, 2018) has featured rarely in media discus­
sions surrounding Brexit.
Immigrants in Mainland Europe
Crimmigration rhetoric in Europe has produced significant negative consequences for im­
migrants to the continent, where De Giorgi (2010) found hyper-incarceration rates (i.e., 
the rate as a multiple of the incarceration rate of nationals) of foreign-born prisoners 
ranging from 3.8 (in France and Germany) to 14.4 (Italy), with an average EU hyper-in­
carceration rate of 6.2. This dynamic persists despite no evidence that immigrants to Eu­
rope offend at rates higher than their native-born counterparts (Bircan & Hooghe, 2011; 
Nunziata, 2015). An explanation may be found in a study of EU countries showing that 
while increased immigration rates do not increase crime victimization, they are positively 
associated with an increase in fear of crime among native-born residents (Nunziata, 
2015).
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Fear of immigrant crime and immigrant criminals, along with the nativism and ethnic 
prejudice with which it regularly co-occurs, has in recent years driven the increased suc­
cess of authoritarian, right-wing parties and politicians in elections across Europe (Mud­
de, 2012; Stockemer, 2016). Anti-immigrant parties currently control the governments of 
Italy, Hungary, and Poland, and hold significant numbers of seats in the parliaments of 
many others, as well as the European parliament itself (Nakamura & Witte, 2018), where 
they continue to manipulate public fears about Europe’s ongoing “crisis” influx of 
refugees fleeing the Syrian civil war, and the aftermath of recent high-casualty terrorist 
attacks perpetrated by ISIS-affiliated immigrants and foreign nationals (National Consor­
tium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2019). There is currently a 
high potential for this movement to force the European Union to adopt more restrictive 
policies toward refugees, asylum seekers, and irregular migrants—a move that would 
likely exacerbate issues of criminal victimization plaguing refugee camps in Greece (Ben 
Farhat et al., 2018), as well as creating further issues with the highly dangerous human 
smuggling routes across the Mediterranean from North Africa to Southern Europe (Inter­
national Organization for Migration, 2019).
Immigrants in the Middle East
The gap between perception of immigrant populations and their realities is particularly 
pronounced in the fast-growing economies of the Arabian Peninsula: chiefly Saudi Arabia, 
The United Arab Emirates, and Qatar. Immigrant populations in many of these countries 
exceed the native-born (International Organization for Migration, 2015), with the United 
Arab Emirates featuring the most extreme disproportion at nearly 85% of its population 
consisting of immigrants. Given the comparatively vast privileges accorded citizens of 
each of these oil-based economies, the resulting dynamic is one of a deeply segmented so­
ciety: citizens acting with impunity at the top; European and other professional class or 
moneyed migrants of the global elite occupying a sort of legal “limbo” below them, where 
severe legal consequences for minor (but culturally proscribed) transgressions are a con­
stant possibility even within the context of privilege accorded the citizenry of military al­
lies and trading partners; and at the bottom, contract laborers from India, Pakistan, 
Nepal, the Philippines, and other labor-exporting nations suffering constant exploitation 
and an almost complete lack of recourse to the legal system under Kafala (Gardner, 
2010). Research on the involvement of immigrants in crime and criminal activity in these 
societies is therefore limited by this dynamic, with a meaningful proportion of reported 
crimes consisting of vague or trumped-up charges of moral turpitude (Nordland, 2017), 
and conviction rates skewed by the almost total lack of legal rights accorded to the immi­
grant accused (Murray, 2012). Public perception of immigrant criminality in these coun­
tries appears to be driven by a handful of high-profile cases (Gutierrez, 2019), some of 
which concluded in obvious and disturbing miscarriages of justice, in countries where de­
capitation and amputation still stand as commonly applied, legally sanctioned punish­
ments for non-capital crimes. If the story of immigrant othering and attributions of crimi­
nality is one inextricably linked to labor exploitation, curtailment of human and civil 
rights, and political suppression, then the Kafala system and the situation of immigrants 
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in the countries of the Arabian peninsula is emblematic of the extremes to which a ruling 
class and regime will go in order to ensure a steady supply of cheap labor, and the main­
tenance of low-cost goods and services for the privileged few.
Immigrants in Sub-Saharan Africa
Immigration to the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa is primarily internal to the continent, 
with the important exception of South Africa, which continues to attract significant mi­
gratory flows from the United Kingdom and South Asia. Much of the internal migration 
between Sub-Saharan African countries is driven by internal crises of governance, natur­
al disaster, or war; significant recent outmigration from Zimbabwe, the Congo, South Su­
dan, and Chad falls into this category, with refugees into neighboring countries fleeing 
privation driven by sectarian conflict, famine, government corruption, and political re­
pression. These refugees commonly face xenophobia in their destination countries, driven 
in large part by fear of crime and perceptions of immigrant criminality. South Africa, in 
particular, follows the pattern set in U.S. political discourse of conflating undocumented 
status with criminality (Crush & Peberdy, 2018). Despite a long-term post-apartheid crime 
drop paralleling that seen in Europe and the United States, a recent uptick in violent 
crime rates has given South Africa an international reputation as a dangerous travel des­
tination (Lehohla, 2015; Perry & Potgieter, 2013). This image bears little resemblance to 
reality, and in any case, there is no evidence to suggest that recent increases in street 
crime in the country are associated with immigration.
Immigrants in East Asia
China and the surrounding nations of East Asia have experienced significant economic 
growth in the 21st century coupled with falling birth rates, a dynamic similar to that 
which has driven much of the labor migration to North America and Europe beginning 
since the latter half of the 20th century. A range of factors including government policy, 
geography, and culture has historically limited labor migration to countries like Japan and 
China, however, to small-scale and intermittent regional immigration patterns until the 
current century, when increased international engagement (particularly on the part of 
China) and accelerating demographic change have given rise to novel immigrant commu­
nities like Africans in Guangzhou and Brazilians in Japan. In both cases, public percep­
tion, political discourse, and media coverage surrounding these communities focuses on 
compounded attributions of criminality: a generalized suspicion of immigrants rooted in 
the long-standing traditions of a closed society, and recently popularized Western stereo­
types of African and Latin American peoples as disproportionately criminogenic (Friman, 
2001; Lan, 2015). There is little indication in the research literature that these attribu­
tions of criminality match the reality of criminal participation rates for these or more tra­
ditional intraregional populations of labor migrants such as Filipinos; however, not unlike 
the American case, undocumented status is not clearly differentiated from other forms of 
criminal participation in policy or public discourse relating to these communities 
(Jimenez, 2015). Japan, for example, imposes harsh criminal penalties for overstaying 
visas—a civil offense in the American context. As the scale of labor migration to the re­
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gion increases with China’s imminent emergence as the world’s largest economy—and fa­
cilitated by major transport infrastructure projects under China’s “One Belt, One Road” 
initiative—an American-style dynamic of “punitive inclusion” seems likely to develop 
(Cheliotis, 2017).
Immigrants in South and Southeast Asia
The nations of South and Southeast Asia are traditionally source countries for large-scale 
labor migration to many other regions, as discussed (see sections “IMMIGRANTS IN THE 
UNITED KINGDOM” and “IMMIGRANTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST”). Intraregional migra­
tion over the course of the 20th and 21st centuries has been punctuated by mass move­
ments of refugees in response to a series of sectarian conflicts and realignments, begin­
ning with the partition of British India into the Hindu nation of India and the Muslim na­
tion of Pakistan, and most recently with the mass migration of Rohingya Muslims into 
Bangladesh from predominantly Buddhist Myanmar (Ghosh, 2016). Not unusually, this lat­
est movement began with a series of community-level conflicts incited by crimes of vio­
lence: retaliatory beatings, mass rapes, arsons, and massacres between neighboring Ro­
hingya and Rakhine Buddhist communities in the country’s Northwest. Myanmar’s Bud­
dhist government, however, largely eschewed a meaningful resolution of these events 
through criminal justice system mechanisms in favor of military retaliation and inflaming 
public sentiment against the Rohingya minority. This decision set in motion an ethnic 
cleansing campaign to eliminate a minority community now designated as “illegal immi­
grants” by the government of Myanmar, despite the Rohingya’s long-standing, multigen­
erational residence in the region (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
2017). As refugees now primarily residing in Bangladesh, there is no data to indicate that 
Rohingya forced migrants to participate in criminal activity at differing rates from native- 
born residents in their host countries, though they are considered to be at high risk for 
victimization through human trafficking, forced labor, and forced prostitution. Similar dy­
namics face other refugees and stateless populations in the region, such as ethnic Viet­
namese residents in Cambodia (Mauk, 2018). As in other regions in the world, it appears 
to be consistently the case that attributions and accusations of criminality leveled against 
immigrants in political discourse cause measurably more social harm than actual criminal 
participation by immigrants.
Immigrants in Australia
Over a quarter of Australia’s population is overseas born, with nearly half of Australians 
identifying as a first- or second-generation immigrant. The country’s immigrant popula­
tion is extremely diverse, with no single source country accounting for a majority or even 
a plurality of the country’s immigrants. Very little of this population is undocumented or 
unauthorized according to the U.S. understanding of the concepts; due largely to 
Australia’s remoteness and lack of land borders, most unauthorized immigrants in Aus­
tralia are visa overstayers, a group representing approximately .02% of the country’s pop­
ulation in 2010.
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Recent research (Sydes, 2017) drawing upon official census and crime incident data ex­
amined the effect of immigration on violent crime across several hundred neighborhoods 
in Sydney and Brisbane. The results were consistent with the research consensus on im­
migrants and crime in the United States, showing that immigration is negatively associat­
ed with crime in Australia as well. In terms of social disorganization, however, there is 
some evidence that significant linguistic diversity within neighborhoods was positively as­
sociated with violent crime, suggesting that extreme linguistic diversity could lead in 
some circumstances (such as the absence of effective social services) to breakdowns in 
informal social control.
Regardless of this evidence, attributions of criminality to immigrants in Australian politi­
cal discourse have contributed to the country’s development of one of the most harshly 
restrictive immigration control regimes in the world (Welch, 2014). Rooted in the crimino­
logical theories of rational choice and deterrence, the system mandates that refugees, 
asylum seekers, and attempted unauthorized migrants be detained indefinitely outside 
Australia’s borders, primarily (until its closure in 2017) at the infamous Manus Regional 
Processing Centre in Papua New Guinea, and at other detention centers located in that 
country in the years since. The stated rationale for this policy is to deter future asylum 
seekers from attempting the journey to Australia—a justification rooted in the supposed 
deterrent effect of criminal justice system incarceration, which this form of immigrant de­
tention closely resembles. These facilities are privately managed by for-profit corrections 
companies, further blurring the line between detained migrants and incarcerated crimi­
nals and indicating the serious consequences that crimmigration policies can have for at­
tempted migrants across the globe.
Overview of the Evidence on Immigrant Partici­
pation in Select Crime Categories
Crime as a conceptual category encompasses a wide variety of culturally proscribed de­
viant or transgressive activities. Breaking down the larger concept of crime into particu­
larly salient subcategories and examining the variance in immigrant participation be­
tween them is essential to a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between 
immigration and crime in a global context.
Immigrants and Terrorism
Acts of terror committed by immigrants tend to receive more coverage (and are more 
commonly defined as terrorism) than functionally similar incidents involving their native- 
born counterparts. This is likely in part a lingering effect of the global attention focused 
on the World Trade Center attacks of September 11, 2001, along with the series of high- 
profile, high-casualty attacks carried out by immigrants and foreign nationals in major 
European cities in the years since. As a result, however, similar attacks carried out by na­
tive-born perpetrators—whether to advance ideologies of racism, white supremacy, tradi­
tional gender relations, misogyny, or other causes—are rarely labeled as terrorism in the 
Immigrants and Crime
Page 21 of 35
PRINTED FROM the OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (oxfordre.com/crimi­
nology). (c) Oxford University Press USA, 2020. All Rights Reserved. Personal use only; commercial use is strictly prohibited 
(for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).
Subscriber: OUP-Reference Gratis Access; date: 25 August 2020
mainstream press, despite being placed in the same category by scholars and researchers 
(Powell, 2011). This disproportionate attention—both in terms of the number of incidents 
and the overall number of casualties (with the exception of the 9/11 attacks themselves)— 
contributes to a strain of discourse in many developed nations that posits Muslim immi­
grants in particular as an existential threat to the safety and culture of the nations receiv­
ing them.
It is clear, in the wake of the “Muslim Ban” executive order by U.S. President Donald 
Trump, Brexit in the United Kingdom, debate over the “Refugee Crisis” in Europe, and 
the brutal suppression of Muslim Uighurs in Western China, that the discourse surround­
ing immigrants and terrorism has led to significant negative consequences for Muslim im­
migrants and religious minorities around the globe. The distance between public percep­
tion and reality on this topic (as on so many of the others under discussion in this article) 
is vast. While the definition of terrorism can be fluid, the generally accepted definition in­
volves the use of violence in pursuit of political aims; nearly 20 years of the “War on Ter­
ror” has led to an increasing reluctance on the part of national media or the popular 
imagination to ascribe such aims to domestic assailants; instead, attacks by domestic ide­
ologues are increasingly classified as “hate crimes” or ascribed to racial animus, whether 
or not they are intended to influence politics or achieve political aims. The term “terror­
ism” is thus assumed to apply to an act of war by a foreign power—most commonly identi­
fied as Islam itself rather than a foreign nation—of which immigrant assailants are as­
sumed to be representatives.
Scholars, however, tend to cleave more closely to the accepted definition in comparative 
analyses of terrorist acts, and as such, their findings are consistent: with few exceptions, 
a significant majority of terrorist attacks in a given nation-state are committed by native- 
born individuals in support of the political aims of domestic groups, and the majority of 
terrorist casualties are caused by these acts (National Consortium for the Study of Terror­
ism and Responses to Terrorism, 2019). This is not to discount the handful of horrifying, 
high-casualty attacks that have been carried out in Europe and elsewhere by Islamists, 
many of whom were first- and second-generation immigrants or foreign nationals.
Incidents of terror—whether committed by foreign nationals, immigrants, or native-born 
individuals—extract an effectively incalculable human cost reflected in the loss of life and 
severity of injury resulting from their commission. Recent global research, however, finds 
no correlation between the number of migrants in a country with either the number or 
severity of terrorist attacks occurring there (Forrester, Powell, Nowrasteh, & Landgrave, 
2019). This finding suggests that a primary policy goal frequently cited in anti-immigrant 
rhetoric—decreased risk of terrorism—rests on a false premise. Research suggests that 
reducing immigration to a given country—even narrow restrictions on immigrants from 
Islamic majority countries, who anti-immigrant groups in the United States and Europe 
frequently portray as presenting a higher risk of terrorism to destination countries—will 
have no predictable effect on either the number or the severity of future terrorist attacks.
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Immigrants and Transnational Crime
Transnational crime presents a unique case in the involvement of immigrants in crime 
and criminal activity, because the definition of the phenomenon means that it intrinsically 
relies on individuals with access to multinational social and/or economic networks for its 
existence. In practical terms, this means that transnational crime on its largest scale re­
quires the initiation, or at least participation, of major multinational corporations for 
which such networks are a matter of day-to-day business operations; recent cases such as 
HSBC’s laundering of nearly $1 billion for Mexican and Colombian drug cartels (Saviano, 
2016; United States of America against HSBC Holdings PLC, 2018; White, 2017) show the 
importance of corporate complicity in ensuring the continued profitability of such enter­
prises, and maintaining their significance and integration into the “legitimate” global 
economy.
By the same token, however, the drug cartels for which HSBC laundered funds rely signif­
icantly on immigrant labor for many of the criminal activities that produced the income in 
question. In addition to their utilization of social networks in both the source and destina­
tion countries for black market products such as drugs and trafficked individuals, immi­
grants often possess the linguistic abilities necessary to communicate and translate busi­
ness arrangements between networks in source and destination countries, as well as le­
gitimate cause for international travel that can serve as an important cover for smuggling 
and other clandestine transportation activities (Furman et al., 2016; Pickering & Ham, 
2015).
Human trafficking—sex trafficking in particular—provides a particularly stark example of 
the potential for the roles of crime victim and criminal offender to overlap, as well as the 
complicated role played by the criminalization of status offenses in exacerbating rather 
than mitigating the social harm caused by criminal activity. In many cases, legal prohibi­
tions against prostitution criminalize sex workers, who may themselves be trafficked indi­
viduals laboring under the threat of violence or other kinds of coercion. In other cases, 
trafficked individuals may participate in or otherwise facilitate the trafficking of others, 
whether due to coercion or evolving social integration into a transnational criminal net­
work. The use of “madams” for the purpose of grooming newly trafficked individuals into 
the local culture and traditions of sex work in destination countries has long been ob­
served in sex trafficking operations worldwide. These madams are commonly themselves 
former trafficking victims whose position within the transnational criminal networks that 
originally trafficked them has changed and evolved over time (Meshkovska, Siegel, Stut­
terheim, & Bos, 2015). In cases such as these, survival and personal advancement trump 
individual trauma and collective solidarity with fellow victims.
Policy Implications
A critical criminological perspective on the relationship between immigration and crime 
requires the examination of social harms resulting not only from the criminal actions of 
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individuals, but also from state efforts to control these two phenomena. Immigrant deten­
tion and deportation, in particular, are patterned after the punitive incarceration em­
ployed by criminal justice systems across the globe. The social harms arising from ap­
proaches to immigration control rooted in punitive criminal justice system practices are 
thus comparable.
Detention and Deportation as Social Harms and Causes of Crime
Deportation policies pursued since the 1980s by the United States have planted the seeds 
for future domestic and transnational crime and criminality in many of the source coun­
tries to which deportees have historically been returned. A prime case involves El Sal­
vador (along with, more recently, the other countries of Central America’s Northern Tri­
angle, Honduras and Guatemala) and the MS-13 and Calle 18 street gangs. Named for 
streets in the areas of Los Angeles where the gangs were originally formed in the 1980s, 
American deportation policies sent many members of these gangs back to their native El 
Salvador following felony convictions. There, faced with extremely limited opportunities 
and minimal social ties to a society many of them had not lived in since infancy or early 
childhood, these gang members re-established their previous associations and modes of 
existence, at first with their fellow deportees, eventually gaining a foothold among the 
general populace as well (Dingeman, 2018; Kalsi, 2018). Now, in the absence of functional 
governments in the Northern Triangle, these gangs are the most significant organized au­
thority in many communities throughout the region, including major urban areas, where 
they have effectively usurped the state’s monopoly on violence. Their use of violence as a 
first-order governance tactic and economic strategy is largely responsible for the three 
Northern Triangle countries featuring some of the highest rates of homicide and other vi­
olent crimes in the world. These violent crimes are themselves now widely understood to 
be the major driver of migration from the Northern Triangle countries to the United 
States (Swanson & Torres, 2016), especially the subsequent waves of unaccompanied mi­
nors and families with children who made up the bulk of the migrant “caravans” that the 
Trump administration attempted to turn into a major moral panic during the run-up to the 
2018 midterm elections in the United States. The MS-13 case is just one example of many 
in the historical ways that the colonial adventures and subsequent policy initiatives (both 
foreign and domestic) of destination countries in turn influenced conditions that con­
tributed to outmigration in source countries (i.e., push factors).
The approach to immigration control and enforcement popularized in the United States 
and being adopted incrementally in other destination countries around the globe relies 
heavily on a crimmigration model borrowed from the criminal justice system: a program 
of apprehensions rooted in the procedures of law enforcement; a complex of detention fa­
cilities that borrow heavily from penological architecture and practices, as well as often­
times relying directly on existing correctional infrastructure; a judicial process lacking 
the protections (such as presumption of innocence) that guide criminal court proceed­
ings; and finally deportation, which is intended to discharge the state’s responsibilities to 
the human and civil rights of the immigrant as surely as execution does for the convicted 
criminal.13 A rapidly building scholarly consensus holds that the social harms caused by 
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this system—including (but not limited to) reduced crime reporting rates and police coop­
eration, family separation, psychological trauma, loss of social capital, and public health 
consequences for immigrant communities—far exceed any potential benefits to receiving 
nations in terms of crime reduction, the rationale most commonly used to justify the in­
vestment of public monies in immigration control (Leyro, 2017; Leyro & Stageman, 2018). 
Scholars in fact theorize that crimmigration-based enforcement and control strategies 
could have the opposite effect, reducing or eliminating the protective factors that con­
tribute to the relatively low rates of criminal participation found in immigrant communi­
ties.
There are, however, some important potential benefits that crimmigration policies 
present to the native-born—in particular, to dominant racial, ethnic, and cultural groups— 
in destination countries: namely, deepening the vulnerability and exploitability of immi­
grant laborers and providing flexible mechanisms through which to extract financial prof­
it and other benefits from the immigrants in their midst. The dehumanization and other­
ing justified by attributions of criminality is reinforced in the public consciousness by the 
criminal justice-based systems and structures of crimmigration that ostensibly address vi­
olations of civil conduct in migration decisions, further reinforcing public beliefs that 
unauthorized and undocumented migration are intrinsically criminal acts. Dehumanized 
communities and individuals are uniquely vulnerable to exploitation and abuse at the 
hands of bad actors, as demonstrated by the countless examples across regions and cul­
tures discussed throughout this article. Further, their exploited labor has long under­
pinned economic dynamics in receiving countries that are not otherwise sustainable and 
arguably destructive, reliant as they are on the cheap and widely available consumer 
goods and services that immigrant labor so often provides. The belief that immigrants are 
inherently criminogenic contributes to the global sense that economic systems of this na­
ture are fundamentally just in their punitive nature; the fact that they are not suggests 
that these economic systems should be reconsidered and reformed in tandem with the in­
humane immigration policies that sustain them.
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Notes:
(1.) The official dismantling of the European colonial project in the decades following 
World War II was accompanied by a range of “soft power” systems and structures intend­
ed to maintain economic and diplomatic influence over the new nation-states carved out 
of former colonial territories. In many cases, these structures facilitated labor migration 
from the former colonies to their former European colonizers, as part of a formal effort to 
address labor shortages resulting from the massive militarization, destruction of infra­
structure, and loss of life that were the war’s lasting legacy. In many cases (e.g., from the 
Anglophone Caribbean to the UK, from Algeria to France, from Suriname to Holland, 
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etc.), official sanction and the availability of work permits combined with language ability 
and the more prosaic pull factors of enhanced wages and quality of life to produce lasting 
migration flows and significant, long-term resident minority populations (see, e.g., 
Bosma, Lucassen, & Oostindie, 2012; Hansen, 2003).
(2.) Yar (2012) defines social harm as “the manifold forms of harm that emerge from dom­
inant patterns of social, economic, technological, and cultural practices” (p. 56), where 
harm is broadly defined as the “foreclos[ure] and limit[ation of] humans’ possibilities for 
being” (p. 54). The conceptual or ontological framing of this definition does not exclude 
easily recognizable harms such as material deprivation, psychological trauma, physical 
injury, or death; indeed, there is no more comprehensive foreclosure of a human’s possi­
bility for being than death. Thus, the concept of social harm can and does encompass tra­
ditional definitions of crime but may favor the examination of the social structures and 
systems that surround these crimes over individual-level explanations.
(3.) This literature is voluminous and encompasses most of the works cited in the “Refer­
ences.” The recent meta-analysis of Ousey and Kubrin (2018) assesses 51 representative 
studies of the immigration-crime relationship undertaken between 1994 and 2014. As 
such, it provides an excellent entry point into the field and serves as a valuable guide to 
the relative merits of the studies under discussion.
(4.) Now thoroughly discredited in academic literature, until the 1970s cultural deficit 
theory was commonly used to explain the supposed higher incidence of criminality among 
African Americans, as well as racial differences in educational attainment, employment, 
wealth accumulation, etc. Despite a broad and long-established consensus among schol­
ars that the tenets of this theory are fundamentally racist (Persell, 1981), it continues to 
feature in contemporary media and political discourse.
(5.) Reports commissioned by American anti-immigration and anti-immigrant advocacy 
organizations return repeatedly to this logic and other discredited hypotheses in order to 
contest the scholarly consensus that immigrants exhibit lower crime rates than native- 
born residents. These reports are often presented in a manner intended to allow lay read­
ers to mistake them for empirical research.
(6.) Numerous instances of this phenomenon have occurred in the United States follow­
ing the election of President Donald Trump and the resulting expansion of immigration 
enforcement under his administration. In particular, the fear of deportation and related 
immigration consequences has driven down reporting rates for domestic violence and 
sexual victimization among Latino communities with a significant population of undocu­
mented/unauthorized immigrants. See, e.g., Medina (2017) and Engelbrecht (2018).
(7.) See, e.g., Brown (2016), who frames the issue as a political appeal in the mode of the 
Nixonian “Southern Strategy,” or coded racial appeals to white voters intended to com­
municate that the candidate deploying them will favor whites over minorities in his policy 
choices.
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(8.) As the term “nationality” implies, the contemporary concept of citizenship is struc­
tured by the global partition of space into modern nation-states; a nation-state’s citizens 
are not simply the individuals who reside within its borders but only those residents who 
can establish a legal claim to its associated patrimony. While the rationale for this legal 
claim varies from one nation-state to another, citizenship status effectively establishes the 
relationship between state power and the rights of the individual citizen. Without the set 
of individual rights conferred by citizenship, stateless individuals are unable to establish 
legal standing in their country of residence, regardless of social ties. Like undocumented 
immigrants in the United States or laborers under the Kafala system, they are entirely at 
the mercy of state power and consistently under threat of removal or other consequences 
should they come into conflict with it. See Carens (2013).
(9.) Latin legal terminology for “law of blood,” meaning German citizenship was originally 
conferred on the basis of German descent and ethnicity. This is in contrast to the Ameri­
can jus solis, or “law of soil,” which confers citizenship (with very few exceptions) to any 
individual born within the territorial borders of the United States.
(10.) And in fact was recognized as such by the U.S. Supreme Court in its June 27, 2019, 
decision on the matter (Department of Commerce et al. v. New York et al., 2019).
(11.) The regional subheadings included in this section are organized into significant des­
tination regions that feature similar source countries and patterns of migration. World Mi­
gration Report 2018.
(12.) See, e.g., Martinez (2018) for more information on the high proportion of federal in­
carceration driven by criminal prosecutions of immigration offenses.
(13.) Per Snider (1998), deportation bears unavoidable practical and theoretical similari­
ties to the pre-modern criminal punishment of banishment, which was commonly meted 
out by monarchies as a way to effectively sentence offenders to death (via starvation in 
unsettled wilderness, for instance) while simultaneously showcasing “the King’s mercy.” 
The parallels to contemporary insistence that “deportation is not a punishment” are hard 
to ignore, as this contention allows modern governments to claim the punitive functions 
of deportation (i.e., both specific and general deterrence of future instance of unautho­
rized migration) without taking ethical responsibility for collateral consequences that are 
often severe, up to and including the otherwise avoidable death of the deportee (Stillman, 
2018).
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